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Michael Olafusi

MIT: Game Theory

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You can register on MIT Opencourseware for Game Theory at https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/economics/14-126-game-theory-spring-2010/ 

About the course

This course is a rigorous investigation of the evolutionary and epistemic foundations of solution concepts, such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium. It covers classical topics, such as repeated games, bargaining, and supermodular games as well as new topics such as global games, heterogeneous priors, psychological games, and games without expected utility maximization. Applications are provided when available.


1 Review of basic concepts

[FT] Chapter 1, 2, and 3

[OR] Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 6

2 Application: Bargaining with complete information

[OR] Chapter 7

Rubinstein, A. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model." Econometrica 50 (1982): 97-109.

3 Extensive-form games with imperfect information

[FT] Chapter 8

[OR] Chapter 11, and 12

Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. "Sequential Equilibrium." Econometrica 50 (1982): 863-894.

4 Signaling and forward induction

[FT] Chapter 8, and 11

[OR] Chapter 12

Cho, I. -K., and D. Kreps. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria." Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (1987): 179-221.

5 Application: Signaling in bargaining Admati, A., and M. Perry. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining." Review of Economic Studies 54 (1987): 345-364.
6 Repeated games and their applications

[FT] Chapter 5

[MS] Chapter 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 11

Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring." Econometrica 58 (1990): 1041-1063.

Abreu, D., P. Milgrom, and D. Pearce. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships." Econometrica59 (1991): 1713-1733.

Fudenberg, D., and E. Maskin. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information." Econometrica 54 (1986): 533-554.

Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information." Econometrica 62 (1994): 997-1039.

7 Reputation formation

[FT] Chapter 9

Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. "Reputation and Imperfect Information." Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982): 253-279.

Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. "Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence." Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982): 280-312.

Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma." Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982): 245-252.

Fudenberg, D., and D. Levine. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player." Econometrica 57 (1989): 759-778.

8 Application: Screening and reputation in bargaining

[FT] Chapter 10

Gul, F., H. Sonnenschein, and R. Wilson. "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture." Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986): 155-190.

Abreu, D., and F. Gul. "Bargaining and Reputation." Econometrica 68 (2000): 85-117.

9 Rationalizability and correlated equilibrium

[OR] Chapter 12

[FT] Chapter 8, 9, and 11

Bernheim, D. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior." Econometrica 52 (1984): 1007-1028.

Pearce, D. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection." Econometrica 52 (1984): 1029-1050.

Aumann, R. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality." Econometrica 55 (1987): 1-18.

Battigalli, P., and M. Siniscalchi. "Rationalizable Bidding in First-Price Auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 45 (2003): 38-72.

10 Supermodular games and their applications

Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. "Rationalizability and Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities." Econometrica 58 (1990): 1255-1277.

Vives, X. "Complementarities and Games: New Developments." Journal of Economic Literature 43 (2005): 437-479.

Buy at Amazon Topkis, D. M. Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. ISBN: 9780691032443.

Van Zandt, T., and X. Vives. "Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities." Journal of Economic Theory 34 (2007): 339-360.

11 Global games and their applications

Buy at Amazon Morris, S., and H. S. Shin. "Global Games: Theory and Applications." In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume I. Edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. ISBN: 9780521524117.

Carlsson, H., and E. van Damme. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection." Econometrica 61 (1993): 989-1018.

Morris, S., and H. S. Shin. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Attacks." American Economic Review 88 (1998): 587-597.

Frankel, D., S. Morris, and A. Pauzner. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities." Journal of Economic Theory 108 (2003): 1-44.

12 Review  
13 Learning and evolutionary foundations

[W] Chapter 2, and 3

[FL] Chapter 4, 5, and 6

Kandori, M., G. Mailath, and R. Rob. "Learning, Mutation, and Long-run Equilibria in Games." Econometrica61 (1993): 29-56.

Ellison, G. "Learning, Local Interaction and Coordination." Econometrica 61 (1993): 1047-1071.

Möbius, M. "The Formation of Ghettos as a Local Interaction Phenomenon." Draft paper. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000. (This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader.PDF)

Ellison, G. "Evolving Standards for Academic Publishing: A q-r Theory." Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002): 994-1034.

Sandholm, W. "Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing." Review of Economic Studies 69 (2002): 667-689.

14 Review  

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